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serious threat to society," and (2) "that [the defendant's] conduct in
committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravatedbattery to
the victim." Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4C(1990). Thelaw ofrelevancy limits
the prosecution to introducing only evidence which would tend to make more
likely that one of those two statutory factors exist. The court summarily
concluded that the fact that Quesinberry's weapon was stolen is admissible to
show his propensity to be armed. Likewise, the court concluded that the
existence of a factor which mitigates the crime under statute is admissible in
support of the death penalty.
Where evidence of questionable relevancy is known to exist, attor-
neys should seek to exclude the evidence pretrial by motions in limine and
objections. The courts seem to be more willing to admit questionable
evidence at the penalty phase, and the appellate courts are hesitant to find
error when viewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole. A pretrial
ruling on the relevancy of an item may receive more favorable treatment,
at trial or on appeal.
C. Refusal to Allow Parole Ineligibility Information
The court also refused to allow evidence that a life sentence would
mean ineligibility for parole for at least 30 years. The duration of the
defendant's stay in prison under a life sentence is almost certainly relevant
to counter an argument of the defendant's "future dangerousness" under
Virginia Code Section 19.2-264AC. Additionally, the court's ruling
deprives the defendant of the right under Lockett to present any evidence
which could mitigate the penalty. Many jurors may hold the mistaken
view that a life sentence would allow release in ten or fewer years. See
Paduano & Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Con-
cerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Hum.
Rts. L. Rev. 211, 221-22 & nn. 30-34 (1987). As a result, the temptation
exists to impose the stricter penalty (in this scenario, death) simply
because the alternative is considered too lenient. The information about
the actual meaning of a life sentence can clear up this misconception and
make ajuror more likely to impose a life sentence. In fact, ajury has been
known to specifically request parole eligibility information, indicating
that jurors do come to the trial with preconceived notions of what the
practical effects of a life sentence might actually be. Eaton v. Common-
wealth, 240 Va. 236,397 S.E.2d 385 (1990). See case summary of Eaton,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 2 2 (1990).
Clearly, the Virginia Supreme Court feels that a defendant is not
entitled to clear up misconceptions of the true meaning of a life sentence.
Eaton, 240 Va. at 248-49, 397 S.E.2d at 392-93; Quesinberry, 241 Va. at
371,402 S.E.2d at 223. However, the Virginia Supreme Court is not the
final arbiter of federal constitutional law. Federal courts have yet to
determine this issue. As a result, attorneys should continue to request an
instruction regarding the practical effects of a life sentence and assign the
denial as error for federal review.
D. Procedural Default
Quesinberry also illustrates the ease with which defense counsel can
default or waive an issue and prevent it from ever receiving appellate review.
In order to preserve an issue for review, counsel must timely object at trial,
Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:25, assign the ruling as error, Virginia
Supreme Court Rule 5:27, and argue the issue on brief, Virginia Supreme
Court Rule 5:17. See Powley, Perfecting the Record of a Capital Case in
Virginia,CapitalDefenseDigest,Vol.3,No. l,p.26(1990). Thecourt'snrling
in Quesinberry reveals just how strictly these rules are applied. Counsel
objected to the court's definitions of several terms only seconds after the
definitions were given. The objection came immediately after the jury retired
to the jury room, perhaps so that the issue could be argued outside the jury's
presence. On appeal, the court held that counsel's argument on the issue was
procedurally barred because the objection at trial was untimely. Quesinberry
at228. Inaddition,thecourtdeclinedtorevievfoursubstantiveissuesbecause,
although properly preserved at trial and assigned as error, the issues were not
argued on brief. Id. at 222.
Attorneys should make sure that every possible issue for appellate
review is properly preserved, assigned as error, and argued on brief. This
is especially true considering that federal courts will refuse to hear issues
which are procedurally barred under state law. See case summaries of
Coleman v. Thompson, Capital Defense Digest, this issue, and McClesky
v.Zant, Capital Defense Digest, this issue. If page limitations on appellate
briefs prevent a thorough discussion on the issues, attorneys should
reqtiest an extension. Where the page extension request is denied, that
denial in itself should be assigned as error, briefed, and properly preserved
for review. See case summary of Stockton v. Commonwealth, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
Summary and analysis by:
G. Douglas Kilday
LITIGATING THE "VILENESS" FACTOR IN VIRGINIA
BY: VICTOR A. LAGO
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the constitutionality of the "vileness" aggra-
vating factor of the Virginia death penalty sentencing scheme, and
suggests that the judicial application of the "vileness" factor is constitu-
tionally infirm in two respects. First, the "vileness" factor on its face is too
vague to provide meaningful guidance to the sentencer as provided by the
eighth amendment.' Second, the Virginia courts' systematic failure in
providing capital defendants with proper notice of the narrowing con-
structions which they intend to apply denies capital defendants due
process as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. A defense attorney
can litigate pretrial for the proper application of the "vileness" factor to
generate valid claims for appeal and to insure that the Virginia courts and
the Commonwealth apply the factor in a constitutional manner.
THE VIRGINIA "VILENESS" FACTOR
IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
In the landmark United States Supreme Court case, Furman v.
Georgia, the Court held that states could not impose the death penalty
under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that punish-
ment could be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 2 The Court
required that capital sentencing schemes provide a meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which a death penalty is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not.3
Following Furman, state legislatures attempted to formulate death
penalty statutes which guided sentencing discretion by permitting a death
sentence only on a finding of certain aggravating factors which made the
offender more culpable than others that committed similar crimes. In
fashioning these aggravating factors many states found guidance in the
Model Penal Code, which provided a template of aggravating factors. 4
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Section 210.6(3)(n) of the Model Penal Code included a "vileness"
factor. Under the Model Penal Code rubric, if the murder was "especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity," a state
could impose the death sentence.5 The drafters of the Model Penal Code
first recognized that the degree of ruthlessness involved in a killing, and
the perpetrator's intent to commit more violence than necessary to kill a
victim, could be a "rational" classification for the application of the
severest of all criminal penalties.
Following the Model Penal Code template, many states introduced
the "vileness" aggravating factor into their death penalty sentencing
schemes. Georgia's capital murder scheme first passed the constitutional
standards set out in Furman. In Gregg v. Georgia the United States
Supreme Court upheld Georgia's capital sentencing scheme, which
included a "vileness" factor among its statutory aggravating factors.6 The
Supreme Court did not specifically address the vagueness of the Georgia
"vileness" factor. Nevertheless, in blessing the statute, the Court noted
that ifastate wished to authorize capitalpunishment, ithad a constitutional
responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoided the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. 7 The Court
required that death penalty statutes channel the sentencer's discretion by
"clear and objective standards."'8 Thus, even at this early point in modem
capital murder jurisprudence the Supreme Court expressed concern that
an aggravating factor could be too vague to limit the discretion of the
sentencer as to exactly what kind of activity fell within the aggravating
factor's definition. In this regard, a "vileness" factor posed a major
dilemma because the elements of the factor used equivocal terms that
could apply to any killing.
In Godfrey v. Georgia, the Supreme Court revisited the Georgia
death penalty statute in 1980, to test the constitutionality of the Georgia
"vileness" factor.9 The statute provided that the sentencer could impose
the death penalty upon a finding that the offense was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind or aggravated battery to the victim". 10 The Supreme Court found the
application of the "vileness" factor unconstitutionally vague in Godfrey
because nothing in the words of the factor, standing alone, implied any
inherent restraint on sentencer's imposition of the death sentence.11 Any
person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize every murder as
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman".12
In Georgia death penalty cases under the "vileness" factor prior to
Godfrey, the trial courts correctly channeled the jury's discretion by
providing narrowing constructions, i.e., definitions of each vague statu-
tory term. 13 In prior cases the Georgia Supreme Court had held that
"depravity of mind" comprehended "the kind of mental state that led a
murderer to torture or commit an aggravated battery before killing a
victim" while "torture" and "aggravated battery" required a showing of
"physical abuse". 14 The Court determined that in Godfrey the Georgia
Supreme Court failed to apply the narrowing constructions developed in
prior cases and absent a method of guiding sentencing discretion, the
application of the Georgia "vileness" factor was unconstitutional.
In 1988 the Supreme Court again addressed the constitutionality of
the "vileness" factor in Maynard v. Cartright.'5 In Maynard, a defendant
convicted of double murder challenged the constitutionality of the Okla-
homa "vileness" factor which permitted a death sentence on a finding that
the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. 1 6 The Court
found that absent any narrowing constructions, "especially heinous,
atrocious and cruel" gave no more guidance than the language of the
Georgia "vileness" factor found unconstitutional in Godfrey.17 However,
the Court noted that a state could use a factor, constitutionally infirm on
its face, if state courts monitored its use and provided narrowing construc-
tions of the vague terms to the sentencer 18
Following the decisions in Maynard and Godfrey, other states which
use a "vileness" factor provided narrowing constructions in the form of
instructions to theirjuries. In Alabama, which uses a "heinous, atrocious
and cruel" "vileness" factor, the Alabama Supreme Court defined all the
vague terms. 19 For example, the Alabama Supreme Court defimed "cruel"
as "designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference or even
enjoyment of the suffering of others".20 The state attempted to apply these
terms consistently in all capital cases under the Alabama "vileness"
factor. 21 North Carolina also applies narrowing constructions to its
"heinous atrocious and cruel" "vileness" factor and defines these terms
conclusively as "a conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily
tortuous to the victim." 22 Thus, many states follow the guidelines set forth
in Godfrey and Maynard and consistently correct their vague "vileness"
factors by providing narrowing constructions to their sentencers.
The Virginia "vileness" factorsupports a sentence of death if thejury
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct in commit-
ting the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman
in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the
victim". 23 The language of the Virginia "vileness" factor mirrors the
Georgia "vileness" factor found unconstitutionally applied in Godfrey.24
Therefore, Virginia only may apply its "vileness" factor if its courts
monitor the use of the factor and provide narrowing constructions of the
vague statutory language.
Unlike the courts of its sister states, the Virginia Supreme Court has
held that its trial courts may dispense with furnishing narrowing construc-
tions to the jury.25 While some trial courts have given narrowing
constructions for some of the terms, the Virginia Supreme Court has not
required subsequent capital cases to use those definitions or even to
provide any narrowing constructions at all.26 In Clark v. Commonwealth,
the defendant assigned as error failure of the trial court to define "outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman", "depravity of mind" or
"aggravated battery." 27 Prior to Clark, the Virginia Supreme Court
defined "aggravated battery" and "depravity of mind" in Smith v. Com-
monwealth.2 8 Nevertheless, the trial court refused to communicate these
same definitions to the jury or to give any othernarrowing constructions.29
The Virginia Supreme Court found that the Smith definitions "were not the
best or the only ones" and that all the terms of the "vileness" factor had a
common meaning which did not require additional clarification.
30
In Tuggle v. Commonwealth, decided in 1984, the defendant re-
quested two jury instructions which defined "aggravated battery" and
"depravity of mind."31 The trial court refused to provide the jury with the
narrowing constructions requested by the defense although they were the
same constructions as those given in Smith.32 The Virginia Supreme
Court reaffirmed Clark and did not mandate that the trial court define the
statutory terms of the "vileness" factor because no single definition was
correct in all instances.33 Thus, the Virginia Supreme Court continues to
dispense with the requirement of narrowing constructions under the
rationale articulated in Clark, although this policy directly conflicts with
the holdings of Godfrey and Maynard.
While the Virginia Supreme Court fails to place an affirmative duty
on its courts to provide narrowing constructions in every case involving
the "vileness" factor, the court occasionally gives narrowing construc-
tions for "depravity of mind" and "aggravated battery." In Smith v.
Commonwealth the court defined "depravity of mind" as "a degree of
moral turpitude and psychic debasement surpassing that inherent in the
definition of legal malice and premeditation". 34 It defined "aggravated
battery" as "a battery which is qualitatively and quantitatively more
culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder". 35
In Shell v. Mississippi, the United States Supreme Court held, per
curiam, that a narrowing construction for a component of the Mississippi
"vileness" factorprovided by a Mississippi trial court was unconstitution-
ally vague.36 In Shell, the Mississippi death penalty statute contained a
vague "vileness" factor which according to the constitutional require-
ments of Godfrey and Maynard, required a narrowing construction to
guide the sentencing discretion of the jury.37 The trial court instructed the
jury that the word "heinous" meant "extremely wicked or shockingly
evil"; "atrocious" meant "outrageously wicked and vile"; and "cruel"
meant"designed to inflict a high degree of pain with indifference to or an
enjoyment of the suffering of others. 38 The Supreme Court unanimously
found no meaningful distinction between these narrowing constructions
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and the "vileness" factor itself.39 Any person of ordinary sensibility could
use the narrowing constructions to characterize almost every murder.40
Therefore, the Court found no means to meaningfully distinguish the
application of the death penalty to the cases in which it was to be imposed,
from the many cases in which it was not, as required by Furman.
In Jones v. Murray, a recent federal habeas case decided by the
Fourth Circuit, the defendant argued that Virginia Supreme Court's
narrowing construction for "depravity of mind" was facially unconstitu-
tionalbecause of its vagueness.4 1 Thedefendantcontended thattheSmith
definition of "depravity of mind" supra, exacerbated the vagueness which
the narrowing construction itself attempted to alleviate because the
definition was utterly unintelligible to the average juror.42 The Fourth
Circuit rejected this argument. It found that the U.S. Supreme Court had
upheld the "vileness" factors of other states which employed narrowing
constructions which were more vague than the Virginia "depravity of
mind" definition. 43 However, the Fourth Circuit did not consider Shell
which clearly controlled in Jones v. Murray.
Shell stands for the proposition that narrowing constructions, pro-
vided to channel the jury's discretion, may themselves be unconstitution-
ally vague. In Shell, the definition of heinous as "wicked or shockingly
evil" did nothing to distinguish the higher standard of culpability which
the eighth amendment demands in capital cases. In this regard, the
Virginia narrowing construction of "depravity of mind" is particularly
suspect. In applying the "depravity of mind" narrowing construction the
juror must know what "moral turpitude" and "psychical debasement"
mean in orderto make a proper application. Moreover, thejury mustknow
the definition of "legal malice" and "premeditation" to determine if the
murder surpassed those minimum standards. Without further guidance,
a juror cannot make a determination of whether a particular murder
involved more "depravity of mind" than that involved in every killing.
Like the use of "wicked" to limit "heinous" in Shell, the depravity of mind
definition fails to provide a meaningful distinction between these limiting
constructions and the "vileness" factor itself. Thus, despite the Fourth
Circuit's holding in Jones v. Murray, there is a strong argument that
Virginia's narrowing constructions are unconstitutionally vague.
In summary, broad aggravating factors are constitutionally suspect
because they fail to limit adequately the sentencing discretion of the jury
in making a meaningful distinction between the isolated cases where the
death penalty is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.
"Vileness" factors used in the capital sentencing schemes in many states
are prone to this deficiency because the factors use vague terms that could
apply to any killing. Every murder could be said to be heinous, atrocious
and cruel. The Supreme Court recognized this infirmity in Godfrey and
Maynard, and held that states may only implement unconstitutionally
vague "vileness" factors if state courts clarify the vague statutory terms by
providing the jury with narrowing constructions of the terms. The
Virginia Supreme Court fails to impose this duty on its trial courts.
Moreover, the narrowing constructions adopted by the Virginia Supreme
Court which are used by Virginia trial courts on occasion are unconstitu-
tionally vague under Shell. Thus, the application of the "vileness factor"
in Virginia is unconstitutional under the eighth amendment.
THE PROCEDURAL APPLICATION OF THE VIRGINIA
"VILENESS" FACTOR IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT FAILS TO
GIVE CAPITAL DEFENDANTS PROPER NOTICE
Some of the Virginia courts refuse to require that the Commonwealth
give the defense notice of the aggravating factors and the narrowing
constructions which it intends to rely on. This denies a capital defendant
due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. In
Virginia, both the trial courts and the Supreme Court of Virginia often
deny motions for a bill of particulars asking for, among other things, the
aggravating factors that the Commonwealth seeks to rely on in seeking the
death penalty, and the narrowing constructions if the Commonwealth
intends to seek the death sentence under the "vileness" factor. The
fourteenth amendment requires that the state inform the defendant of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.44 The defendant is entitled
to have the offense charged stated in plain and unequivocal terms.45 The
adversarial format ofa capital sentencing proceeding makes it sufficiently
like a trial that counsel's role is also to ensure that the adversarial testing
process works to produce a just result. 6 Thus, notice requirements also
apply to the penalty phase of a capital trial. In addition, the unique nature
of the death penalty requires additional protection during pretrial, guilt
and sentencing stages.47 Due process demands a greater degree of
reliability in a process that can find death as the appropriate punishment.
48
In Maynard v. Cartright, supra, the United States Supreme Court
held that a state could only use a vague aggravating factor if a state
supreme court monitored its use, and insured that the its courts furnished
the sentencerwith narrowing constructions. 49 Thus, the Virginia"vileness
factor" requires narrowing constructions to further distinguish its applica-
tion because it uses broad, vague terms that could apply to any murder.
The narrowing constructions are, in effect, a limitation and clarification of
the offense charged. Thus, for a capital defendant to have constitutionally
adequate notice and opportunity to defend himself, it is essential that the
Virginia courts insure that the Commonwealth provides the defendant
with both the aggravating factor and the narrowing construction, pretrial.
In a capital trial, failure to provide the defense with narrowing
constructions denies the defendant due process because the trial or
appellate court may apply another definition which the defendant was
unprepared to litigate atthe penalty trial. Justice Blackmun articulated this
danger and the resulting injustice in his dissenting opinion in Lewis v.
Jeffers.50 In Lewis, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the
Arizona "vileness" factor because it did not articulate a limiting construc-
tion applicable to his case.51 When the defendantprepared his defense, the
relevant authority for the narrowing constructions of the "vileness" factor
was State v. Knapp.52 In Knapp, the Arizona Supreme Court recited
dictionary definitions for each of the statutory terms of the Arizona
"vileness" factor, and the defendant could prepare his defense only in
reliance on this authority.53 However, at the time of the defendant's trial
and sentencing hearing, the court used the narrowing constructions given
in State v. Gretzler.54 Gretzler, decided eighteen days before Jeffers' case
went to trial, held for the first time that the vague statutory term "especially
heinous or depraved" encompassed crimes in which the defendant "rel-
ished the killing" and "inflicted gratuitous violence."55 The defendant
could not adequately litigate and defend against the constructions applied
by the sentencer. He could not, for example, offer evidence that tended to
show that he did not "relish the killing."56 Had Jeffers sought, and been
granted the opportunity to defend against every narrowing construction
for which the state intended to offer evidence, his death sentence would
not have rested upon a fact of which he was not aware of at trial.
Considering the striking similarity between the Arizona capital
murder statute and Virginia Code § 19.2-264(C), the danger articulated in
Lewis v. Jeffers could manifest itself in Virginia.57 This potential is best
demonstrated by Clark v. Commonwealth, supra. In Clark, the trial court
failed to define the terms "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman" or "depravity of mind." The Virginia Supreme Court held that
the trial court's failure to give a definition did not constitute reversible
error because more than one possible construction of these terms ex-
isted.58 The court stated that previous definitions of the "vileness" factor
"were not the best or the only ones."59 Therefore, a capital defendant in
Virginia cannot rely on an aggravating factor as having one specific
meaning and seek to defend on those grounds. The court may apply a
different definition from that which the defendant is prepared to litigate,
and his ability to defend himself suffers dramatically.
In a Supreme Court Case decided recently, Lankford v. Idaho, the
Court overturned the death sentence of a defendant because the trial court
failed to give adequate notice of its intention to impose a death sentence,
which violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.60 The
defendant, charged with the first degree murder, received notice of the
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possibility to the death sentence only through the statute that defined
capital murder and the advice of the trial judge at arraignment. 61 How-
ever, the state prosecutor never mentioned the death sentence in subse-
quent plea discussions, during the guilt or innocence trial or prior to the
penalty trial.62 In fact, the state informed the defendant that it would not
seek a death sentence. 63 During the penalty trial, the defendant presented
little mitigating evidence and did not advance any arguments against the
application of certain aggravating factors because the trial court led the
defense to believe that the trial court would not consider a death sen-
tence.64 Nevertheless, the trial courtjudge ignored the state's request for
life, and sentenced the defendant to death.
65
The Supreme Court vacated the death sentence. It noted that notice
of issues to be resolved by the adversary process is a fundamental
characteristic of fair procedure consistent with due process of law.
66 The
Court recognized that the debate between adversaries was essential to the
truth-seeking function because it gave defense counsel an opportunity to
comment on factors which influenced sentencing decisions in capital
cases.67 Thus, the defendant's lack of adequate notice that the judge
contemplated the death sentence created an impermissible risk that the
adversary process malfunctioned.
68
In Lankford, the Supreme Court emphasized that the adversary
process cannot perform its proper role unless the defendant receives
adequate notice that a state plans to impose the death penalty. It also
follows that the defense must receive adequate notice of the full offense
charged in order to properly prepare its case. In this regard, adequate
notice in a capital case involves disclosing both the capital crime, the
aggravating factors to be litigated and any narrowing constructions which
make up the full definition of the offense. Like the defendant in Lankford,
who could not properly defend himself against the death penalty (which
frustrated the truth-seeking function of the adversarial format), a failure by
the state to provide notice of the aggravating factors it will seek to prove,
and the narrowing constructions which clarify the definition, prevents the
defense from properly applying its resources to insure that the defendant
is given a fair trial.
In summary, it has repeatedly been held by the Virginia Supreme
Court that it is the duty of the trial court to compel the attorney for the
Commonwealth, when demanded by the accused, to file such a bill of
particulars as will appraise the defendant of the cause and nature of the
Commonwealth's accusation.69 Moreover, Virginia Code § 19.2-399
provides that in seeking the dismissal of any charge on the grounds that the
statute upon which it is based is unconstitutional, the trial court shall, upon
motion of the defendant direct that the Commonwealth file a bill of
particulars. 70 The bill of particulars protects the defendant's fundamental
right of receiving notice of his accusation as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. It also secures the ability of the defense to exercise a
meaningful opportunity to contest the Commonwealth's evidence on a
factor essential to a sentence of death which allows that the adversary
process serve its truth-seeking function. Because Virginia's procedural
application of the "vileness" factor refuses to require that the Common-
wealth give the defense notice of the aggravating factors and the narrow-
ing constructions on which it intends to rely, the capital defendant is
denied due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
PRETRIAL LITIGATION OF THE "VILENESS" FACTOR
There are many compelling advantages to litigating the application
of the "vileness" factor through pretrial motions. First, the defense is
notified of what components of the "vileness" factor on which the
Commonwealth will rely in seeking the death penalty. With this notice the
defense can properly limit the Commonwealth's evidence in the penalty
trial to that which is relevant to showing the existence of that component.
Also pretrial litigation of the "vileness" factor provides the defense with
an opportunity to test the constitutionality of the narrowing constructions
supplied by the Commonwealth, or to preserve a constitutional claim for
appeal if the trial court fails to give any narrowing constructions at all.
The cornerstone upon which the defense should mount an attack is
the bill of particulars. To achieve its proper effect, the motion should ask
the Commonwealth "to identify every narrowing construction of the
components of the 'vileness' factor upon which the Commonwealth
intends to rely on in seeking the death penalty." If the Commonwealth
refuses to give the narrowing constructions pretrial, the defense can file a
brief pursuant to Godfrey and Maynard which argues that the Virginia
death penalty scheme is unconstitutionally applied unless the trial court
provides narrowing constructions for the vague terms of the Virginia
death penalty statute. This preserves a valid assignment of error for appeal
and encourages the trial court to compel the Commonwealth to deliver the
narrowing constructions.
If the Commonwealth identifies the narrowing constructions by
providing the previous definitions given in Smith, the defense has grounds
for a motion that the narrowing constructions given are too vague to guide
sentencing discretion as required by Shell. In the alternative, the defense
could suggest the definitions given for the "vileness" factor in Georgia and
Arizona which provide more meaningful distinction for the sentencer.
71
However, generating constitutionally correct narrowing constructions is
the job of Commonwealth and the Virginia courts. Nevertheless, if the
court provides narrowing constructions it will correctly follow Maynard
and Godfrey in ensuring that the Virginia "vileness" factor is applied in a
constitutional manner. The defense has a definition upon which to begin
preparing its case for the penalty trial, and it can begin pretrial strategies
such as filing motions in limine to prohibit the introduction of evidence
which is not relevant. Thus, the Commonwealth's proper answer of the
motion for the bill of particulars will serve due process by providing
proper notice of the offense charged and it will advance the truth-seeking
function of the adversarial process.
In conclusion, both the defense and the Commonwealth of Virginia
have much to gain by allowing the pretrial litigation of the "vileness"
factor. As discussed, the Virginia "vileness" factor is unconstitutionally
vague unless the Commonwealth provides narrowing constructions for
the vague statutory terms. Moreover, Virginia's procedural application of
the "vileness" factor, in refusing to require that the Commonwealth give
the defense notice of the aggravating factors and the narrowing construc-
tions on which it intends to rely, denies the defendant due process of law
as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. If the Virginia courts grant
motions for bill of particulars asking for aggravating factors and narrow-
ing constructions they may cure both of the constitutional deficiencies of
the "vileness" factor. However, defense counsel's failure to litigate the
"vileness" factor pretrial not only raises the possibility of defaulting valid
appellate claims, it is equivalent to entering into a lawsuit without
knowing what the suit is about, which is poor litigation strategy under any
circumstance.
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THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT AND THIRTEEN YEARS
OF DEATH SENTENCE REVIEW
BY: ANNE E. MCINERNEY
In 1978, in Smith v. Commonwealth1, the Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed the sentence of the first defendant sentenced to death under
Virginia's capital murder statute enacted in response to Furman v.
Georgia.2 In 1972, in Furman, the United States Supreme Court had
declared that capital punishment, as then administered, was unconstitu-
tional. In the thirteen years since Smith, the Virginia Supreme Court has
had occasion to say a lot and has denied relief on automatic review and
appeal of right in the vast majority of cases.
This piece discusses thehistory of deathpenalty law in Virginiasince
Furman v. Georgia and outlines the Virginia Supreme Courts initial
interpretations of the State's modem capital murder statute in Smith. The
article then examines the development of the law of default and waiver,
the construction and reach of the capital statute, the definition of and range
of relevant evidence going to the aggravating factors, mitigating evidence,
and the selection process of the capital jury since Smith.
The article then considers Virginia's statutory requirement for
automatic review of the death sentence and discusses the possible effects
of the United States Supreme Court's 1983 holding that proportionality
review is not constitutionally required. Despite the statutory requirement
for automatic review, and the constitutional right to meaningful appellate
review, the Supreme Court of Virginia has affirmed almost every death
sentence since 1978. The article contains abrief summary of the few cases
where the supreme court has granted relief.
Virginia's capital murder statute is modeled after the Texas statute
approved in 1976 by the United States Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas.
3
This article contains a brief comparative look at the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals and some of the cases decided by that court. The article
concludes with some observations about the present status of capital
penalty law in Virginia and offers several remedial tactics for use by
Virginia defense counsel.
Furman v. Georgia and Virginia's Response
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court
concluded that capital punishment, as then administered under statutory
systems which permitted unbridled discretion, violated defendants' eighth
amendmentprotection againstcruel and unusual punishment as well as the
fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection clauses. 4 In
response, two-thirds of the states, including Virginia, which has had a
death penalty statute since 1796, began crafting capital murder statutes
which sufficiently limited jury discretion and avoided arbitrary and
inconsistent results. In 1976, the Supreme Court struck down North
Carolina and Louisiana statutes which had mandatory death penalty
provisions for certain crimes but upheld statutes in Florida, Georgia, and
Texas because each of those states had provided adequate standards to
guide the exercise of the jury's sentencing discretion.5
In 1977, using the Texas statute found constitutional in Jurek v.
Texas as a guide, the Virginia General Assembly enacted the capital
murder statute substantially as it stands today. All of the approved statutes,
including those of Texas and Virginia, provide for automatic review of death
sentences. Most, including Virginia's but not Texas', require the reviewing
court to consider whether the punishment is disproportionate to that imposed
insimilarcases. Alsoin Virginia, butnot inTexas, every capital defendant has
an appeal of right directly to the state supreme court rather than to the court of
appeals, usually the first level of the appellate process. When a defendant in
Virginia makes an appeal of right to the supreme court, this appeal is
consolidated with the automatic review of the death penalty and advanced on
the docket for an expeditious process.
In the Beginning: Smith
A trial jury convicted Michael Smith under the rape-murder subsec-
tion of the new capital murder statute in 1978.6 The Supreme Court of
Virginia upheld his conviction and death sentence in Smith v. Common-
wealth.7 The court consolidated the defendant's appeal of right and
automatic review of sentence8 Smith raised multiple issues in his appeal,
which fall into five broad categories: pre-trial proceedings, the guilt trial,
constitutional challenges to the capital murder statute, the penalty trial,
and the propriety of the penalty imposed. 9
Smith assigned error to the trial court's exclusion of ajuror for cause
related to her predisposition against capital punishment. The court stated
on review that, in line with Witherspoon v. Illinoislo and its progeny, the
question of whether a venireman should be excluded turns upon the
question whether, in fact, he is "irrevocably committed" to vote against the
deathpenalty. Relying on footnote 9 of the Witherspoon opinion, the court
held that "absent an unambiguous statement of absolute objection, the
trial judge cannot assume absolute objection." Under the Witherspoon
holding and the corollary note, "'general objections' to capital punish-
ment are not constitutionally sufficient to justify the exclusion of a juror
for cause; nothing less than an absolute objection ... to vote against the
deathpenalty, wilsuffice."1 Whilethetrialcourt notedthat theexcluded
juror's responses to questions during voir dire were sometimes inconsis-
tent, it nevertheless concluded that "life [was] all she'd ever give" and
discharged her from the jury panel.12 On review, the supreme court held
that while it could not say that such a finding of fact was unmistakably
clear, the ruling did not contravene Witherspoon.
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Smith also challenged the Virginia capital murder statutory complex
under which he was convicted and sentenced. The court responded with
a full explanation of the four proceedings which it must conduct before it
may deliver a sentence of death. The court conducts three evidentiary
hearings. In the first, the jury determines guilt or innocence and may
convict the defendant of the crime charged or a lesser-included offense. If
the jury convicts the defendant of a class 1 felony, the jury determines in
the second phase whether the penalty should be death or life imprison-
ment. The jury may hear aggravating evidence concerning circumstances
of the offense and the history and background of the accused.
